There is evidence that competing firms outsource R&D to the same independent for-profit laboratory. We draw on this stylized fact to construct a model where two firms in the same industry offer transfer payments in exchange for user-specific R&D services from a common laboratory. Inter-firm and within-laboratory externalities affect the intensity of competition among delegating firms on the intermediate market for technology. Whether competition is relatively soft or tight is reflected by each firm's monetary offers to the laboratory. These offers determine the R&D outcomes, the laboratory's capacity to earn benefits, the profits for the delegating firms, as well as social welfare. We identify the situations in which the laboratory finds it profitable to deliver services to only one firm, or to both of them. In the latter case we compare the delegated R&D game to two other ones where firms conduct in-house R&D, either cooperatively or non-cooperatively. The delegated R&D game Pareto dominates the other two games, and the laboratory earns positive benefits, if and only if R&D services are complementary inside the laboratory, but only limitedly so, and inter-firm spillovers are sufficiently low. The firms' privately-profitable decision to delegate R&D, when the laboratory participates, always benefits consumers.
Introduction
Cases in which firms contract out research and development (R&D) tasks to forprofit laboratories abound. The National Science Foundation (2006) indicates that " [t] he average [real] annual growth rate of contracted-out R&D from 1993 to 2003 (9.4%) was about double the growth rate of in-house company-funded R&D (4.9%). For manufacturing companies, contracted-out R&D grew almost three times as fast as R&D performed internally, after adjusting for inflation." 1 Chemical companies are at the forefront of this phenomenon. They report $4.9 billion in R&D contracted out to other U.S. organizations in 2005 (of which $4.6 billion were for pharmaceuticals and drugs), compared with $2.8 billon in 2000. Mowery (2009) discusses this trend extensively.
More surprising is the fact that rival firms often delegate their R&D to a common independent laboratory. For example, Bayer and ICI (two European firms in the chemical industry that compete on world markets) signed multi-year contracts in 1999 and 2000 respectively with Symyx, a U.S.-based private laboratory. Symyx receives payments by providing access to a proprietary technology for the production of high-value specialty polymers. Similar arrangements have been observed in other sectors also for many years. In the steel industry, a clear example involves two major European suppliers, ThyssenKrupp and Arcelor (now Arcelor Mittal). They initiated in 1995 a long-term contractual agreement with VAI, a laboratory that specializes in the design of new production methods. The R&D services received from VAI are aimed at producing wide, thin strips of stainless and carbon steel directly from the molten metal, omitting the stages of slab casting and rolling.
Only a few economics papers mention real-world cases of firms delegating their R&D to the same independent laboratory. An early example is Katz et al. (1990, pp. 186-190) , where MCC (Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation) is described as "an open-market supplier of contract R&D" that serves application-oriented "deliverables" to large firms (e.g., Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, Honeywell, Westinghouse Electric). More recently, Majewski (2004) , who uses detailed contract-level data, documents several cases where competitors organize their collaboration "as a nexus of arms-length contracts" (p. 20) by outsourcing their R&D projects to a common for-profit entity. ö ratory. However, there exists an extensive literature on in-house R&D. It pays particular attention to how technological spillovers affect in-house R&D outcomes, the profits of the firms, and social welfare, when firms may choose R&D cooperatively or non-cooperatively. In their seminal analysis, d 'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) consider duopolistic firms which invest in deterministic cost-reducing R&D. They show that cooperation augments R&D and improves welfare when spillovers are sufficiently high. The numerous extensions to their model assume in-house R&D, either in each firm's separate laboratory or in a jointly-owned one, with firms sharing the operating costs. For instance, Kamien, Muller, and Zang (1992) specifies spillovers in R&D expenses; Motta (1992) and Rosenkranz (1995) consider quality-improving R&D; Vo n o r t a s (1994) distinguishes between generic research and commercial development; Poyago-Theotoky (1999) and Kamien and Zang (2000) endogeneize spillovers; Hinloopen (2000) introduces Bertrand competition; Amir (2000) compares the cases of R&D outputs and inputs; Amir et al. (2003) generalize past results without relying on specific functional forms; Grunfeld (2003) and Wiethaus (2005) formalize absorptive capacity.
A distinct stream of literature focuses on the supply of technology licenses. It typically considers a monopolistic laboratory which sells a patented process innovation to firms by making take-it-or-leave-it offers. Most analyses build on Katz and Shapiro's (1986) complete information model where the laboratory incurs no cost (i.e., R&D costs have been paid in a previous period), and each downstream firm is a potential user of one unit of the innovative input. They base an inventor's ability to earn benefits on the strategic interaction among potential licensees. For example, Kamien, Tauman, and Zang (1988) examine the case of a superior product licensed to sellers of an inferior substitute; Kamien, Oren, and Tauman (1992) compare alternative licensing strategies; in Sen and Tauman (2007) the patentee can be either an external laboratory or an incumbent firm.
We draw from this literature and industry practices to construct a model where two firms, which we specify as principals, may delegate R&D to an independent laboratory, which is an agent. As in d 'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) the firms are symmetric, invest in cost-reducing R&D, and behaveà la Cournot with respect to a final market. We build on this standard framework by giving firms the option to contract out R&D as an alternative to the benchmark cases in which R&D is conducted in-house either cooperatively or non-cooperatively. As in Katz and Shapiro (1986) , the laboratory is a profit maximizer, and it may serve none, one, or two firms. However, we abandon the assumption that the laboratory sells at no cost, and as a price maker, the fruit of past R&D efforts. Rather, the laboratory responds to payment schemes by supplying firm-specific R&D services at some costs. In this We know of no theoretical model of R&D delegation to a common lab-model, R&D generates two technological externalities: (i) zero, negative, or positive direct externalities depending of the level of inter-firm spillovers, and (ii) zero, negative, or positive indirect externalities depending on whether R&D services are independent, complements, or substitutes inside the laboratory's cost function. This is a delegated common agency model, in the sense of Bernheim and Whinston (1886a) . This means that the agent may accept only a subset of contracts. Our common agency model is also of the public kind, a definition which appears in Martimort (2006) . This says that each principal may observe and verify the level of output delivered to the other principal, and hence condition its payment scheme on it. 2 These specifications reflect situations in which complex non-compete clauses, when authorized by a relatively permissive legal environment in favour of R&D agreements, connect the payments a firm transfers to an external laboratory to some R&D services received by competitors. 3 We exploit the natural ability of the common agency set-up to capture the antagonistic action of two forces: (i) the congruent objectives of firms to share the resources of the same laboratory so as to benefit from economies of scope, and (ii) the competing attempts by each firm to pull the production of R&D by the common laboratory towards specific needs. This leads us to establish a number of interesting and novel results that fully characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the delegated R&D game in the plane of direct and indirect R&D externalities.
First, we identify the situations in which the laboratory chooses to deliver R&D services not only to one firm, but to both of them. In the latter case, while one could expect the laboratory to always earn positive benefits when the R&D services firms demand are complements, we demonstrate this is not the case. It earns positive benefits only if the firm-specific R&D services are substitutable, or not too complementary, and inter-firm spillovers are sufficiently low. Otherwise the laboratory exactly breaks even. Then we compare equilibrium R&D levels, the profits of the firms, and social welfare in a delegated game against those in 2 By comparison, in a private common agency set-up a principal may contract only on the quantities it specifically receives from the agent. This alternative specification is more relevant outside our R&D context, when contractual clauses are either not observable by the agent's clients or not verifiable in court, and when transactions are subject to no-discrimination rules, as on most consumer goods markets (see Gal-Or (1991) , Stole (1991) , Martimort (1996) , Bernheim and Whinston (1998) , Martimort and Stole (2003b) , Calzolari and Scarpa (2004) ).
3 Most papers on R&D agreements refer to the US National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA). It gives firms the possibility of limiting antitrust analysis to the rule of reason (in lieu of the per se illegality rule) on all "properly defined, relevant research and development markets." According to Martin (1996a, p. 270) it leads antitrust authorities to adopt a "permissive attitude." Amir et al. (2003) also emphasize that "a permissive antitrust attitude towards R&D cooperation has been the norm in Europe and Japan early on" (p. 184).
the benchmark games with in-house R&D. As a main result, we find that R&D delegation Pareto-dominates cooperation and non-cooperation, and the laboratory earns positive benefits, if and only if R&D services are sufficiently complementary inside the laboratory and inter-firm spillovers are low. With high spillovers, that is, when direct externalities are positive, at least one of the parties (the laboratory, the firms, or consumers) cannot gain strictly more in the delegated R&D game than in the benchmarks. In all cases, we find that the firms' choice to tap R&D from an independent laboratory never harms consumers. This leads to the important conclusion that there is no reason for a regulator to prevent firms to opt for R&D delegation when it takes place along the lines described in this paper.
The present analysis complements those on the industrial organization of R&D, in the spirit of Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Ambec and Poitevin (2008) , which examine the impact of non-deterministic R&D on the relative efficiency of a separate governance structure (where a single user buys an innovation from an independent unit) and an integrated structure (in which the user sources R&D internally). In the two papers there is a unique R&D user. We, on the other hand, are interested in the strategic interaction of several firms which not only contract with a common laboratory but also compete in the open market. Another strand of the R&D literature analyzes cooperative R&D in vertically-related industries (Banerjee and Lin (2001, 2003) , Atallah (2002) , Brocas (2003) , Ishii (2004) ). In these papers, firms may benefit from imperfectly-appropriable process R&D produced by a direct competitor, and also by upstream or downstream firms, via spillovers. Unlike in our model, what is transacted between successive production stages remains a homogeneous input to be transformed into some final good, not R&D services. More recent papers formalize the leakage of technological secrets between a firm and an external laboratory (Lai et al. (2005 ), Ho (2007 ). The firm faces the possibility of seeing the innovation it contracted for, or some information it shares with the subcontractor, sold to a competitor. The main objective is to identify which contractual scheme (revenue-sharing, lump-sum payment) minimizes the damaging diffusion of knowledge, under alternative information structures, in a (single) principal-agent framework. Our analysis is complementary, since it ignores the leakage problem, while it introduces indirect externalities inside a laboratory that possibly contracts with up to two firms; and the latter firms may opt for horizontal R&D cooperation as an alternative. Another recent paper by Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2008) also shares some features with ours. In an extension of Sen and Tauman (2007) it characterizes the optimal two-part tariff contract for a cost-reducing technology, which is licensed to Cournot firms with differentiation. It is found that the innovation diffuses to all firms when the patent holder is either an external laboratory or when it uses its technology to compete with other firms. The cost reduction is also endogenized with quadratic R&D costs. However, unlike in our model, the innovator writes the contract, and technological externalities are absent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the delegated R&D game. Section 3 solves the game explicitly. Section 4 compares the outcomes of the delegated R&D game with those of the two in-house R&D benchmark games as a function of direct and indirect externalities in R&D. Section 5 discusses an alternative scenario, where the two firms cooperate by forming a single laboratory they jointly own, to exploit complementarities in the production of R&D services. Section 6 investigates whether the delegated R&D game can Pareto-dominate the other two, and discusses policy implications. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
A Model of R&D Delegation
A duopoly faces a linear inverse demand function p i (q) = a − b(q i + θ q j ), for i, j = 1, 2, i = j, where q ≡ (q i , q j ) describes non-negative output quantities, p i is firm i's non-negative unit price, a and b are positive parameters, and θ ∈ [0, 1] captures the degree of substitutability between the two products. Each firm can reduce its production costs through process innovations. We assume, as in d 'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) -henceforth AJ -a unit cost of production c i (x) = c − x i − β x j , where c ∈ (0, a), variables in x ≡ (x 1 , x 2 ) describe non-negative firm-specific R&D output levels, and β ∈ [0, 1] is a spillover parameter. It is the proportion of the competitor's cost reduction that enters into a firm's effective cost reduction, with no monetary compensation. Firm i's gross profit function is
We construct three games. In the cooperative and non-cooperative games of reference, R&D is conducted in-house. The two firms simultaneously choose R&D levels either cooperatively to maximize joint profits, or non-cooperatively to maximize their own profits, by incurring quadratic R&D costs in both cases, before competing in quantities in the product market. These standard games are solved in the appendix (see section 8.1).
In the delegated R&D game, there is one independent laboratory. It bears all research and development costs, which increase with the level of R&D services supplied to each firm. Moreover, complementarities or substitutabilities can arise inside the laboratory when it produces services for both firms. Formally:
with δ ∈ [−γ,γ), where the parameter γ is positive (all second-order conditions in the appendix are satisfied when γ is sufficiently large). The parameter δ captures complementary (substitutable) R&D services in the laboratory if it is positive (negative), so that the marginal cost of supplying one firm decreases (increases) with the services supplied to the other firm. 4 If δ = 0, as in AJ and in our cooperative and non-cooperative games of reference, the laboratory is as efficient as each firm's proprietary laboratory. (In section 5 we compare the delegated R&D outcomes with an alternative cooperation set-up in which firms operate a common proprietary laboratory with the same costs as in (1).) More intuitively, there are complementarities (δ > 0) when the laboratory can serve the two firms by using the same resources. Substitutabilities may dominate (δ < 0) when bottlenecks limit the laboratory's ability to simultaneously supply the two firm-specific services. Many R&D contracts include complex clauses that authorize a fine tuning between the payments of a given firm and the R&D services the laboratory may supply to other firms. 5 Hence we let each firm's transfer payment to the laboratory depend on both its R&D, and that of its competitor, purchased from the laboratory. 6 Formally, each firm's net profit is π i (q,x) −t i (x), where t i , the non-negative monetary transfer to the agent, is chosen by firm i as a function of x.
The assumption that the buyer -and not the supplier -of R&D services writes the contract is as in Lai et al. (2005) and Ho (2007) . It reflects practices on the intermediate market for biotechnology, where R&D buyers are large pharmaceutical, agribusiness, or chemical firms (see Ve u g e l e r s (1997), Lerner and Merges (1998) , Argyres and Liebeskind (2002) ). Identical firms address symmetric transfer proposals to the laboratory. This does not imply that equilibrium R&D services, and the related equilibrium payments, are symmetric across firms. While in the cooperative R&D game the ex-ante equal treatment of firms applies when side-payments between firms are ruled out, in the delegated R&D game there is no reason to constrain a priori the laboratory to supply symmetric R&D outputs. 7 In fact, in section 3 we establish that, for some parameter values, the laboratory serves only one firm.
To compare the delegation of R&D with the reference cases, we maintain the assumption that information is complete among firms. 8 This does not extend to the laboratory which needs not know downstream cost and demand functions. We also maintain that information is verifiable by an external enforcer, so that all parties are committed to their contracts (for delegation, and for cooperation). 9 The timing of the three-stage delegated R&D common agency game is as follows. In a first stage, the two firms (principals) simultaneously and noncooperatively choose a transfer function t i (x), i = 1, 2, they offer to the laboratory (an agent). In a second stage, the laboratory accepts either both contractual offers, or only one, or none, and chooses the amounts of firm-specific R&D services x to maximize its own benefits given by:
where t i (x) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. The laboratory refuses all contractual offers if they imply lower benefits than an exogenous payment we normalize to zero. The laboratory also refuses firm j's offer if it earns less when it accepts both offers than by taking only firm i's offer, i, j = 1, 2, i = j. Formally, the participation constraints for the two firms' contractual offers to be accepted by the laboratory are:
i = 1, 2. In equilibrium (3) is always satisfied, hence the laboratory takes the two contracts, because the firms' payments cannot be negative. Should the laboratory contract exclusively with firm 1 (say), to deliverx ∈ arg max x {t 1 (x) − s (x)}, for all
7 In the terminology introduced by Leahy and Neary (2005) , the "ex-ante equal treatment" means that the symmetric firms are assumed to invest equally in R&D when they cooperate, "a natural starting point" (p. 384). 8 In the pharmaceutical industry, an R&D contract between a large pharmaceutical firm and an independent biotech laboratory may relate to all stages of the drug development process. While the earliest stages, for the identification of drug targets are the riskiest, Robinson and Stuart (2007) , who offer a detailed micro-level empirical analysis of 125 R&D contracts, explain that in the case of later-stage agreements "contracting problems are less severe because contingencies can be readily specified and outcomes are subject to external validation" (p. 7). Our model clearly relates to the latter category of agreements.
9 Agreements on the market for technology usually direct an external enforcer (private arbitration, or a Court) in case of litigation, and include detailed provisions for dispute resolution (e.g., Robinson and Stuart (2007) ).
This does not imply that choices in (x 1 ,x 2 ) are always symmetric, as established in the next section. When discussing policy implications later, we will consider situations where the laboratory must earn positive benefits to participate (i.e., when L (x) > 0 is a constraint). This occurs if the laboratory incurs positive (arbitrarily small) installation costs in addition to s(x), or faces a profitable outside option.
In the third stage, given x, as supplied by the laboratory, firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose quantities q, in the Cournot manner.
For any given x, denote by q * i (x) the Cournot-Nash quantity each firm sells in the open market. For any given t≡(t 1 ,t 2 ), denote by X(t)≡arg max x L (x(t)) the set of R&D services which maximize the laboratory's benefits. Then for any x ∈ X(t i ,t j ) and x ∈ X(t i ,t j ), firm i's transfer function t i is a best response to the other firm'
In words, when the gross profits π i (q * (x),x) exceedˆπ i (x), the difference between the transfer proposals t i (x) and t i (x) is equal to the difference between π i (q * (x),x) and π i (q * (x),x); otherwise the transfer t i (x) is set to zero. A truthful transfer proposal, on its positive part, thus exactly reflects the firm's valuation of x relative tox.
The solution concept of the delegated R&D game is the truthful subgameperfect Nash equilibrium (TSPNE). The three-tuple
is firm i's equilibrium payoff. It is well known that non-truthful strategies may also be obtained as a Nash equilibrium in delegated common agency games. Bernheim and Whinston (1986b) have introduced the truthfulness as an equilibrium refinement, and derived properties that offer a strong justification for using it. A first property, when expressed in the terms of the present context, says that for any set of transfer offers by any one of the two firms, there exists a truthful strategy in the other firm's best-response correspondence. This implies that a firm can restrict itself to truthful strategies. A second property is that all truthful Nash equilibria are coalition-proof. In our case, this means that joint net profits, as obtained by the two firms in a TSPNE, are not lower than in any other subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. 10 10 A Nash equilibrium in a common agency game is coalition-proof if it is robust to credible threats of deviations by some subsets of the principals (see Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) for a formal definition). When there are only two principals, a coalition-proof equilibrium is Paretoefficient among principals (Bernheim and Whinston (1986b) , p. 16, footnote 11). See also Martimort
Equilibrium Analysis
The cooperative and non-cooperative games of reference adapted from AJ are solved in section 8.1 of the appendix. 11 In this section we characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the delegated R&D game.
As standard we proceed backwards. In the final market stage, each firm i chooses q i to maximize π i (q, x), given q j and x, with i, j = 1, 2, i = j. This yields two reaction functions, which we use to solve for each firm's Cournot-Nash quantity q * i (x). By inserting this quantity into π i (q, x), we obtain each firm's concentrated profits
The inter-firm spillovers, which impact π * i (x), are a direct externality because firm i's gross profits depend not only on x i , but also on x j . The externality is positive (negative) if an increase in x j has a positive (negative) impact on firm i's concentrated profits. Formally:
For any positive quantity, this follows directly from the expression of concentrated profits (see (11) in the appendix, section 8.1)). In what follows, we identify positive (negative) direct externalities with β > (<)θ /2.
Next, to solve the delegated common agency stages, define the joint profits function for the two firms and the laboratory as:
Within-laboratory technological conditions, as captured by s(x) in (4), give rise to an indirect externality. It is negative (positive) if R&D services are substitutable (complementary) in the laboratory's cost function:
This follows directly from (1). We identify positive (negative) indirect externalities with δ > (<)0. In the plane (β , δ ), both direct and indirect externalities are zero at the "pivotal" point (θ /2, 0) only. (2006, pp. 15-19) for an extensive discussion on use of truthfulness as an equilibrium refinement. 11 The standard non-cooperative R&D game is identical to another one where, in lieu of in-house R&D production, there are two independent laboratories. In that alternative game, each firm writes a contract with a dedicated laboratory to obtain specific R&D services in exchange of transfer payments. This gives two symmetric principal-agent relationships (on this see Gal-Or (1997) , Section 3, pp. 241-248). In that case s(x i ), with δ = 0 as in AJ, is firm i's payment for x i to its dedicated laboratory. In a complete information set-up, if each laboratory must earn non-negative benefits to participate, each firm's payment can be chosen so that each laboratory exactly breaks even. The problem is however different if there is a common independent laboratory.
The following claim states that both direct and indirect externalities are internalized by the independent laboratory when it maximizes its own benefits: 12
Proposition 1 (Joint Profits Maximization) In all TSPNE in which L≥0, the laboratory's choice of R&D to maximize its benefits (2) is equivalent to maximizing joint profits (4). This is a restatement of a result by Bernheim and Whinston (1986b, Theorem 2, p. 14) adapted to our context. 13 It establishes that the attempt by firms to maximize individual profits, by non-cooperatively delegating R&D, leads the common forprofit laboratory to deliver R&D services which actually maximize the joint profits of all parties, that is, the two firms and the laboratory. This "efficiency" (from the viewpoint of firms and the laboratory only) result is rooted in the truthfulness refinement concept, as discussed above. It specifies that the laboratory is offered two transfer schedules which exactly reflect the respective shape of each firm's gross profit function (that is, π * i (x), all x, i = 1,2). The laboratory thus internalizes both direct and indirect externalities, and in equilibrium maximizes the sum of the two firms' profits, net of R&D costs.
Using Proposition 1, we solve:
The laboratory is not limited a priori to symmetric R&D deliverables. We find that for some parameter values it maximizes its own benefits by serving only one firm:
Proposition 2 (Common Laboratory) There exists a continuous strictly decreasing frontier in the externalities plane (β,δ), denoted by¯δ, which takes values in the interval [−γ,γ) and passes below (θ/2,0), such that in all TSPNE in which L≥0 : (a) if δ≤¯δ the laboratory serves one firm only; (b) if δ >¯δ the laboratory serves the two firms.
Proposition 2 establishes that, depending on the level of δ, in equilibrium the laboratory delivers R&D either to one firm only (firm 1 or firm 2, indifferently), or to both of them. The latter situation occurs when technological conditions do not penalize the production of a two-dimensional R&D output, and transfer payments 12 In all propositions we slightly abuse notation by denoting the laboratory's equilibrium benefits simply by L , for conciseness. 13 The result holds for the class of delegated common agency games with the truthful equilibrium as a solution concept. The proof (Bernheim and Whinston (1986b), pp. 24-25) is also available in the notation of the present paper on request from the authors. provide incentives to the laboratory to serve the two firms. In this case, there exists an interior symmetric solution to (5).
Denote by Λ the maximum joint profits. It remains to characterize the distribution of these profits among the two firms and the laboratory. To do that, define the following function:
which gives the highest joint profits of the laboratory and any subset S of firms in 2 N = { / 0, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}}, with N = {1, 2}, and Π( / 0) = 0. Note that Λ = Π(N). The next proposition establishes that the magnitude of indirect externalities (δ ), for given direct externalities (β ), determines the laboratory's ability to appropriate a share of Λ, that is whether its benefits are positive or not in equilibrium. The proposition also displays the firms' symmetric equilibrium payoffs
Proposition 3 (Joint Profits Distribution) There exists a continuous strictly decreasing frontier in the externalities plane (β , δ ), denoted by δ L =0 , and which includes the point (θ /2, 0), such that in all TSPNE: (a) if δ < δ L =0 the laboratory earns positive benefits:
the laboratory exactly breaks even:
This proposition describes a partition of the externalities plane. It results from the fact that both direct and indirect externalities impact the nature of competition on the intermediate market for R&D. This competition is reflected by the two firms' offers of transfer payments (t d 1 (x),t d 2 (x)). On the one hand, if both externalities are negative, a firm's concentrated profit decreases with the other firm's R&D (Property 1), and serving one firm increases the laboratory's cost of serving the other (Property 2). This is a case of tough competition between the two firms for the laboratory's services, which is a source of positive profits for it. On the other hand, if both externalities are positive, a firm's concentrated profit increases in the other firm's R&D, and serving one firm lowers the laboratory's cost of serving the other. Thus, competition for the laboratory's resources is relatively soft and the laboratory earns no benefits. When the externalities are of opposite signs, the laboratory's ability to appropriate benefits depends on their magnitudes. This opposition gives rise to the frontier δ L =0 .
In Proposition 3, when δ < δ L =0 , the firms' payoffs are equal as a direct consequence of symmetric cost and demand conditions. However, when δ≥δ L =0 , there also exist equilibria such that the laboratory exactly breaks even and the firms' payoffs π d 1 and π d 2 are asymmetric (see the appendix, section 8.3). Here we focus on symmetric payoffs π d = Λ/2 to compare them with the cooperative and noncooperative cases in the next section.
Because of space limitation, we relegate to the appendix the explicit expressions of the laboratory's benefits, the profits of the firms, and the frontiers¯δ and δ (in (19) and (35)). For a numerical example that illustrates Propositions 2 and 3, let a = b = 1, c = 3/4, γ = 2, and θ = 3/4. For symmetric R&D services, consider two points in (β,δ) above the frontier¯δ, say (1/5,−1/5) and (4/5,−1/5). The latter point lies in the South-East quadrant of the externalities plane, above the frontier δ L =0 , implying that firms absorb all R&D benefits. Each of them receives When δ is close to the lower bound −γ, a problem of congestion arises, in which case the firms' payment schemes provide incentives to the laboratory to specialize in the production of only one line of R&D services. Since the frontier¯δ decreases when β increases, the congestion is more frequent when direct externalities are low. Then the joint-profit maximization problem calls for a corner solution. In the latter situation, that is below¯δ, the asymmetry in the supplied R&D levels is captured by the firms' respective transfer payments. In equilibrium, the two identical firms earn the same net positive profits, although R&D levels are asymmetric. When x d 1 = 0 < x d 2 (the laboratory does not serve firm 1, say), the laboratory receives asymmetric payments
1 is positive, firm 1 participates in the financing of the R&D output, although it does not receive anything directly from the laboratory. It benefits from firm 2's purchased R&D through spillovers. 14 14 It is straightforward to compare the asymmetric maximizers¯x d 1 = 0 and¯x d 2 > 0 of Λ(x) in (5) as obtained for all δ <¯δ (one may permute the subscripts), with the symmetric interior solution
we obtain when δ =¯δ. From the equilibrium expressions computed in the appendix one finds¯x d 2 = 2x d on the frontier¯δ. Next, continuity of Λ(x) in δ implies that the firms' symmetric profits with (¯x d 1 ,¯x d 2 ) are the same as with (x d ,x d ), therefore we may focus on the consumer surplus to compare total welfare (w) either with an interior solution or a corner solution, again on¯δ. For all β and θ less than 1, simple algebra leads to¯w d > w d (with an equality sign if β = 1 or θ = 1).
We already know from Propositions 2 and 3 thatδ and δ L =0 are downward sloping frontiers in the externalities plane, so that situations in which both firms receives R&D, and the laboratory only breaks even, are more frequent when interfirm spillovers are high (the intuition is that the firms' interests are more congruent than with negative direct externalities). We may also describe how the two frontiers are impacted by changes in θ and γ: Proposition 4 Given β and δ , the effect of changes in θ or γ on the frontiersδ and δ L =0 in the externalities plane is: dδ /dθ > (=) 0 and dδ L =0 /dθ (=) > 0 for all β (=) < 1; dδ /dγ < 0; and dδ L =0 /dγ 0 iff β θ /2.
In words, the less differentiated the products (i.e., θ approaches 1), the higher the two frontiersδ and δ L =0 . Hence tougher final market competition results in narrower subsets of points (β , δ ) where the laboratory serves both firms, and where it only breaks even. A decreasing R&D productivity (i.e., γ rises) has an opposite impact onδ , however it has a more subtle effect on δ L =0 , which in fact rotates clockwise around the "pivotal" point (θ /2, 0). (Recall that δ L =0 indeed includes that point, whileδ crosses the externalities plane below it.)
The next result relates to the latter "pivotal" point, where both direct and indirect R&D externalities are zero: Proposition 5 At the no-externalities point (θ /2, 0) the outcomes of the delegated R&D game are the same as in the (non-)cooperative in-house R&D games.
This characterization is useful in the next section, where we focus on symmetric interior solutions, that is on
, in order to compare the equilibrium outcomes of the delegated R&D game with the ones obtained in the in-house R&D benchmark games.
R&D, Profits, and Welfare Rankings
In this section we partition the externalities plane (β , δ ) by deriving the frontiers on which symmetric R&D outcomes, the profits of the firms, or welfare are equal in the delegated R&D game and in either the cooperative or the non-cooperative games of reference. Note from the onset that, as a consequence of Proposition 5, all frontiers defined in the following paragraphs include the "pivotal" point (θ /2, 0).
R&D Outcomes
We now compare the symmetric delegated R&D outcome x d in (20) with the cooperative and non-cooperative benchmarks x c and x n (for algebraic expressions see the appendix, section 8.1). 
(ii) There exists a continuous frontier δ x d =x n in the externalities plane, such that in all TSPNE x d x n if and only if δ δ x d =x n, with
Direct and indirect externalities combine to give Lemma 1. First consider Lemma 1-(i). The cooperative and delegated games yield the same R&D solution when there are no indirect externalities because of Proposition 1 (joint-profit maximization) and of Property 2 (R&D costs are the same in both games when δ = 0). We know that the external laboratory is more (less) efficient than in-house laboratories when indirect externalities are positive (negative), that is, when δ > 0 (δ < 0).
Second, consider Lemma 1-(ii). Recall that, from Property 1, optimal R&D is greater (smaller) in the cooperative than in the non-cooperative benchmark game for positive (negative) direct externalities. Let direct externalities be non-negative (β≥θ/2). If indirect externalities are also positive, the laboratory's higher efficiency means that delegated R&D exceeds the cooperative, and hence the noncooperative, solutions. If indirect externalities are negative, the laboratory is at a disadvantage in the production of R&D over in-house laboratories. However, as it internalizes inter-firm direct externalities via the payments it receives, it is only for sufficiently negative indirect externalities that non-cooperative R&D exceeds the delegated game solution. Consequently, δ x d =x n must cross in the South-East quadrant of the externalities plane. Now let direct externalities be negative (β < θ/2). If indirect externalities are also negative, the laboratory's lower efficiency than inhouse laboratories means that the delegated solution is smaller than the cooperative and (by transitivity) the non-cooperative one. However, as the laboratory gains in efficiency as δ increases, there exist sufficiently high positive indirect externalities for the R&D outcome under the delegated game to exceed that under the Figure 1 , allows us to rank optimal R&D across the three games. (All figures include a reference to the following results in AJ extended to our model with horizontal differentiation: (i) x c > (=, <)x n if and only if β > (=, <)θ /2; (ii) π c = π n at β = θ /2, otherwise π c > π n ; and (iii) w c > (=, <)w n if and only if β > (=, <)θ /2.) It is of interest that optimal R&D in the delegated case is greater than in either of the two games of reference for sufficiently high indirect externalities, even when direct externalities are negative. This result stands in contrast with cooperative R&D always being less than non-cooperative for negative direct externalities.
Firms' Profits
We compare the firms' profits π d , as obtained in Proposition 3, with the benchmarks π c and π n (as computed in the appendix, section 8.1).
Lemma 2 (Cooperative, Non-Cooperative, and Delegated Profits) (i)
(ii) There exists a continuous frontier δ π d =π n in the externalities plane such that in all TSPNE π d π n if and only if δ δ π d =π n, with
The intuition for δ π d =π c follows from how the two externalities combine. For the same reasons as in section 4.1, joint profits Λ increase ceteris paribus with indirect externalities. However, when a part of the joint profits Λ goes to the laboratory, which is the case for δ < δ L =0 , then indirect externalities must be sufficiently positive to generate enough surplus to compensate the firms. Hence, if direct externalities are negative, the locus which equalizes the profits of the firms in the delegated and cooperative games must lie in the North-West quadrant of the externalities plane. It cannot however lie above δ L =0 where joint profits in the delegated case exceed those in the cooperative game, but are divided equally between the two firms. If direct externalities are positive, the frontier is confounded with δ = 0 because of Proposition 1, the cost structure being the same in both games and the laboratory earning zero benefits.
The intuition for the δ π d =π n locus is as follows. Recall that a firm's profits in the cooperative game always exceed those under the non-cooperative one because cooperation internalizes direct externalities. As a firm's profits in both the cooperative and delegated games are equal along δ π d =π c, by transitivity delegated profits exceed non-cooperative ones along that locus. Consider negative direct externalities. For δ = 0, along that line cooperative profits are greater than those obtained in the delegated game. However, the profits of the firms in the delegated game are increasing in indirect externalities (Lemma A-2 in the appendix, section 8.6). Hence, there exists a unique decreasing continuous locus in the North-West quadrant of Figure 2 such that π d = π n . By the same token, there must exist a locus in the South-East quadrant of Figure 2 which equalizes profits in the delegated and non-cooperative games. That locus must lie below δ x d =x n for the following reason. Along δ x d =x n optimal R&D expenditures are equal in both the delegated and noncooperative games. However, the laboratory is less efficient than in-house R&D when there are negative indirect externalities. It follows that joint profits in the non-cooperative game exceed those in the delegated game along that locus. As the laboratory does not earn negative profits, π d < π n along δ x d =x n . Therefore δ π d =π n lies above δ x d =x n . Figure 2 graphs δ π d =π c and δ π d =π n to compare the profits of the firms in the three games. As expected, the profits of the firms are highest in the delegated game when both externalities are positive. However, delegated R&D may yield the lowest profits even if direct externalities are weakly negative and indirect externalities are weakly positive (region immediately below δ π d =π n). This occurs because in that region the laboratory appropriates positive benefits and indirect externalities do not have a high enough impact on joint profits Λ. Hence, positive indirect externalities are necessary but not sufficient for firms to prefer the delegated game.
Welfare
By welfare w, we mean the sum of the joint profits and consumer surplus. The latter increases with R&D levels because lower costs lead to higher quantities and lower prices. 
(ii) There exists a continuous frontier δ w d =w n in the externalities plane such that in all TSPNE w d w n if and only if δ δ w d =w n, with
The frontier δ w d =w c = 0 is the direct consequence of Proposition 1, Property 2, and joint profits Λ increasing with δ. To understand the intuition for δ w d =w n, let direct externalities be negative (β < θ/2). If δ = 0 in that region, with delegation both R&D and the profits of the firms are smaller than with non-cooperation, by Lemmas 1-(ii) and 2-(ii) respectively. Therefore, when indirect externalities are negative, w d < w n along δ = 0. Second, joint profits in the delegated game must be greater than in the non-cooperative game along δ x d =x n because the laboratory is more efficient than in-house facilities, and by definition the same amount of R&D is performed in both games. Moreover, w d increases in δ (see Lemma A-3 in Appendix 8.6). It follows that for each β in the region bounded by δ = 0 and δ x d =x n, there exists a value for δ such that welfare in the delegated and non-cooperative games are equal. The existence of δ w d =w n in the South-East quadrant of the externalities plane can be rationalized in the same way.
Cooperation with Complementarities
Our analysis, and all the results, can be extended to a variant of the cooperative scenario. In this amended set-up, firms not only decide to coordinate their R&D choices, but also combine their proprietary R&D assets into a single entity they own (this is not an independent laboratory). Firms can find it profitable to do so when they identify technological complementaries in their respective R&D outputs. This will occur if (1), with δ ≥ 0, is the R&D cost function of the joint entity. (If δ < 0 firms may keep the two R&D operations separate, an option that is not available with a common independent laboratory.) Recall now from Proposition 1 that, in the R&D delegation game, the external for-profit laboratory chooses the quantities of R&D which actually maximize joint profits, i.e. its own benefits and the sum of the two firms' profits. This implies that the objective function where both firms cooperate is identical to the objective function of the R&D delegated game. It follows that, in this alternative model, the services served to each firm, as well as the welfare level, are the same as with delegated R&D. Only the profits of the firms across the two games differ for some parameter values, because in the cooperative R&D game (with or without complementarities) the two firms absorb all positive benefits the laboratory earns in the delegated R&D model.
One can thus derive new frontiers in the externalities plane, on which the firms' symmetric profits π cc in the alternative cooperative R&D game are equal to those obtained in any of the other games (the superscript "cc" means cooperation with complementarities). The profit frontiers for the comparison of π cc with π c and π n coincide with the ones we derived in Lemma 2 for the comparison of π d with π c and π n , whenever the laboratory earns no benefits, that is, above the frontier δ L =0 in Figure 2 (the proof is available from the authors). This is because, in the latter subspace, firms earn the same equilibrium profits in the alternative cooperative R&D game as with delegation (see Proposition 3). By contrast, strictly below δ L =0 , each firm earns higher equilibrium profits in the alternative cooperative R&D game than in the delegated R&D game where the common independent laboratory appropriates some benefits. One finds also that π cc = π c if and only if δ = 0, and that π cc > π n for all δ≥0. The intuition for this result is that, when complementarities are present, cooperative firms in this alternative model cannot be worse-off than in the cooperative benchmarkà la AJ where no cost complementarities are specified, and a fortiori in the non-cooperative set-up.
From the firms' viewpoint, this game thus leads to the best of possible worlds. However, comparing this new model with the two benchmarks and with our delegated R&D model is a somewhat artificial exercise. The introduction of complementarities across firms, on top of cooperation stricto sensu, is equivalent to assuming that firms jointly acquire the external laboratory without paying for it. This is manna from heaven. Hence the fact that firms would prefer the new cooperative game to anything else should not come as a surprise. In addition, the existence of cost complementarities in the production of R&D is more realistic in a R&D joint-venture, where firms may also adjust the level of spillovers, than in a simple R&D cartel (where firms choose only R&D levels). In a R&D joint-venture, firms find it profitable to choose β = 1 (see Amir et al. (2003) ), in which case payoffs in the new model and in the delegated R&D case are identical, as for any β≥θ/2. 15
Pareto Optimal R&D Organization and Policy Discussion
The juxtaposition of Proposition 3, Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 in the externalities plane allows us to investigate whether one of the three games can Pareto-dominate the other two.
Theorem 1
The frontiers established in Proposition 3 and Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 are such that:
All frontiers are defined on [−γ, γ), and the fact they intersect for β = θ /2 stems from Proposition 5. 16 For (β , δ ) such that 0 ≤ β < θ /2 and δ π d =π c < δ < δ L =0 , the laboratory earns positive benefits (as opposed to zero profits otherwise). Moreover, in that region, consumer surplus, and the profits of the firms, are strictly higher in the delegated game than in the two benchmark equilibria. This does not hold elsewhere in the externalities plane, as can be checked from (9). This leads to our main result: Proposition 6 (Delegation Dominance) The delegated R&D game Pareto dominates the other two games, and L > 0, if and only if 0 ≤ β < θ /2 and
We have therefore established that for certain levels of externalities, consumers, firms, and the laboratory all benefit from the delegation of R&D. Therefore, delegated R&D is a Pareto optimal organizational form. For simple reasons, this cannot occur when direct and indirect externalities are positive. In that case, delegation yields the highest profits and consumer surplus, but the laboratory earns no benefit because the firms' interests are congruent. For opposite reasons, welfare is minimized under the delegated game if both direct and indirect externalities are sufficiently negative, although in this case the laboratory appropriates benefits. What is crucial in order for the laboratory to earn positive benefits is that indirect externalities should not be too high, so that firms still compete for its resources. But joint-ventures. In the latter case, firms jointly agree to set the spillover parameter equal to its maximum level, without coordinating their choices. The scenario of non-cooperation with β = 1 can be easily compared with delegation for all values of δ in Figures 1-4 . 16 The ranking can be extended to the scenario of R&D cooperation with complementarities, as discussed in Section 5. The symmetric R&D outcomes, and welfare, are the same as with delegated R&D. Profit comparisons in the externalities plane lead to δ π cc =π n < δ π cc =π c = 0 for 0 ≤ β < θ /2; δ π cc =π c = δ π cc =π n = 0 for β = θ /2; and
indirect externalities must be high enough to make welfare greater than in the other two games, and let firms obtain more of it than under the two other modes.
Note that, when R&D delegation Pareto dominates, contracting with a common laboratory comes up as an endogenous choice of R&D strategy. To see that, consider an initial stage where firms independently choose one of the three R&D modes, with {c,n,d} as a strategy set. Then assume that delegation Pareto dominates as in Proposition 6 (see also Figure 4 ), so that with (d,d) the firms earn more profit than with (n,n) or (c,c). In this initial stage there are other strategy combinations. Indeed suppose that, if firm 1 chooses d, then firm 2's profit-maximizing reply is n (a similar reasoning applies with c), and look for a contradiction. With (d,n) firm 1 is now the single principal in a complete information set-up with no indirect externality. Hence it makes the laboratory choose exactly the same R&D level as what would be chosen non-cooperatively in-house. This implies that the payoffs of the symmetric firms with strategies (d,n) should be equal, and also the same as with (n,n). This contradicts the starting point that (d,d) yields more profits than (n,n). It follows that, when delegation Pareto dominates, it is also the firms' dominant R&D strategy, and firms are not trapped into a prisoner's dilemma.
Theorem 1 is also useful to examine when the interests of firms and consumers conflict or coincide. This is an important question because firms decide to delegate R&D only if they find it profitable, and if the laboratory participates. We find that, although no one asks for consumers' consent, privately-profitable choice of the firms to delegate R&D cannot harm consumers: Proposition 7 (Laisser-Déléguer) The profit-maximizing decision of firms to delegate R&D implies a higher consumer surplus than with (non-)cooperative in-house R&D.
To see that, note first that in all three games the consumer surplus increases with R&D because lower costs lead to higher quantities and lower prices (see the appendix, section 8.6). Second, in the externalities plane, for all values of direct spillovers, firms find it more profitable to delegate R&D than to do R&D in-house either cooperatively or non-cooperatively if and only if δ is above δ π d =π c (Theorem 1). Now observe that δ π d =π c is the "highest" profit frontier and that it is also always above the two frontiers δ x d =x c and δ x d =x n which allow us to compare the consumer surpluses obtained in all three games (see Figures 1 and 2) . Hence, firms never find it profitable to delegate R&D with consumers being worse off than in either of the two other games (as would be the case if we had, say, δ π d =π c < δ x d =x c for some values of β). A straightforward policy implication is that, when firms behave as described here, there is no motivation for a regulator to prevent firms from delegating R&D. This does not mean there is no room for policy intervention. For some parameter values, welfare is maximized with delegation, though firms find it more profitable to opt for either cooperation or non-cooperation. In that case the regulator can be interested in modifying the firms' incentives -e.g., with subsidies -toward more R&D outsourcing. 17 A more striking result is obtained when the laboratory must earn positive profits to participate (i.e., L (x) > 0 is a participation constraint). In that case, firms delegate R&D only if δ is between δ π d =π c and δ L =0 when direct externalities are negative (i.e., 0 ≤ β < θ /2). They cannot rely on the laboratory's R&D services when direct externalities are positive (i.e. θ /2 < β ≤ 1) because the frontier above which the laboratory earns zero benefits (δ L =0 ) lies below all the other frontiers in that region (see Figure 2) . Consequently, when the laboratory must earn positive benefits to participate, firms will profitably delegate R&D services only when externalities fall in the region defined in Proposition 6 (i.e., the darkly shaded area of the North-West quadrant in Figure 4 ). This implies that real-world firms are more likely to outsource R&D services to a for-profit laboratory when inter-firm spillovers are relatively low, in contrast with the well known prediction that in-house cooperative R&D will be preferred to non-cooperation when spillovers are high. In principle this can be tested empirically.
Conclusion
R&D outsourcing (delegation) is an increasingly important phenomenon, and many rivals delegate R&D to a common independent laboratory. While many theoretical industrial organizational models compare the outcomes of firms doing R&D cooperatively or non-cooperatively, none has, to the best of our knowledge, investigated R&D delegation to a common laboratory and compared the three modes. This paper fills that gap by setting up a simple model where competitors can non-cooperatively choose to delegate R&D to a profit-maximizing laboratory.
We establish a number of novel results. First, only one firm receives R&D services if direct and indirect externalities are relatively low. Otherwise, assuming the laboratory participates whenever it earns non-negative benefits, relatively high direct and indirect externalities are necessary and sufficient for optimal R&D, the profits of the firms, and social welfare to be highest in the delegated R&D game. Second, assuming the common laboratory needs positive benefits to participate, then positive indirect externalities for the delivery of R&D outputs are not sufficient. Firms will obtain services from a for-profit common laboratory if indirect externalities are not too positive (i.e., with either limited complementarities, or substitutabilities, inside the laboratory) when direct externalities are negative (i.e., inter-firm spillovers are low). When indirect externalities are too high they counteract direct externalities and the laboratory only breaks even. A clear empirical implication is that firms are more likely to outsource R&D services to a common laboratory with profitable outside options when inter-firm spillovers are relatively low. This contrasts sharply with the well-known theoretical prediction that in-house cooperative R&D will be preferred to in-house non-cooperative R&D when spillovers are high. Third, as a main result, we find there always exists a region in the externalities plane where the laboratory earns positive benefits and the delegated R&D game Pareto-dominates the other two games if (i) direct externalities are sufficiently negative (for firms to compete for the laboratory's services), and (ii) indirect externalities are positive (so that firms benefit from economies of scope) but not too high (for the laboratory to appropriate benefits). Finally, an important policy implication has a laissez-faire flavor: no regulatory intervention is required when firms decide to delegate R&D to a profit-seeking laboratory. This is because, in this model, the firms' privately profitable choice to contract with a laboratory also benefits consumers. There is room for policy intervention only in favor of more R&D outsourcing, when welfare is maximized with delegation while firms earn higher profits with another R&D strategy. This paper is a first step in the analysis of intermediate markets for new technology with multiple buyers. Since we use standard yet specific forms for the cost and demand functions, future work could also test the robustness of the results to changes in the algebraic specifications. We have proceeded in that direction by using Hinloopen (2000) where in the product market stage firms choose prices rather than quantities, and Amir (2000) to investigate situations where R&D is conceived as inputs (i.e., expenditures) rather than outputs. All our results remain valid. Another interesting extension would be to examine the relationship between R&D outsourcing and absorptive capacity. Instead of comparing R&D delegation with benchmark set-ups, as in the present paper, it is possible to construct a model in which each firm may produce internal R&D and simultaneously tap services from an independent laboratory. Among the open questions remains an investigation of what happens when R&D efforts lead to product innovations. This could be done by assuming that R&D increases quality by using a framework in the spirit of Symeonidis (2003) . It would be also natural to extend the delegated common agency R&D model to more than two firms and/or to multi-dimensional R&D services. Initial efforts in that direction are provided by Billette de Villemeur and Versaevel (2003, 2004) . 18 Finally, our analysis, and the whole literature on which it is based, can be criticized by its assumption of deterministic R&D. To address that critique one may examine situations where the true cost of a R&D program is unknown before it starts. 19 18 Two results in Billette de Villemeur and Versaevel (2003) establish sufficient conditions for Π(S), as defined in (6), with S ∈ 2 N and #N ≥ 2, to be either convex or strictly subadditive, hence for the common agent to exactly break even or to earn positive benefits, respectively. Billette de Villemeur and Versaevel (2004) also uncover mild sufficient conditions for the laboratory to earn zero or positive benefits when the R&D services received by firm i, with i = 1, 2, are x i = (x 1 i , . . . , x d i ), all d ≥ 1. Proposition 3, which characterizes the status of the laboratory's participation constraint in the externalities space, can thus be extended to more than two firms, or to multi-dimensional R&D services. Beyond these first steps, the specific computation of the equilibrium R&D outcomes of the extended delegated R&D game, and the comparison with cooperative and non-cooperative benchmarks, involves the usual tractability difficulties. 19 The conjecture that an agent in charge of R&D activities may have no superior information 8 Appendix
Explicit Solutions of the Benchmark R&D Games
We solve for symmetric R&D outcomes in the cooperative and non-cooperative R&D games adapted from AJ, which we use as benchmarks. (The only difference with AJ is that θ ∈ [0,1] in the present set-up, while θ = 1 in the seminal paper.) Here firms are treated equally ex-ante in the sense of Leahy and Neary (2005) , for simplicity. The final market stage is common to the delegated R&D game and the benchmarks. Each firm i chooses q i to maximize its gross profit π i (q,x), given q j and x, with i, j = 1,2, i = j. This yields two reaction functions, which we use to solve for each firm's subgame Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity:
where α≡a − c. Inserting (10) into π i (q,x), we obtain each firm's concentrated profits:
i = 1,2. The R&D stage is game-specific.
Cooperative R&D. The two firms maximize the joint net profit function π * 1 (x) + π * 2 (x) − γ 2 (x 2 1 + x 2 2 ) in x 1 and x 2 to obtain the symmetric cooperative R&D outcome:
Substitute x c for x 1 and x 2 in the joint net profit expression, and divide by two, to obtain the symmetric equilibrium payoff:
A sufficient second-order condition for a maximum is γb(2 + θ)
(so that the second-order total differential of the objective function is negative).
about project returns before acting dates back from Holmstrom (1989) , who sees it as a "reasonable assumption if we are at the initial stages of a research undertaking" (p. 310). This is compatible with the specifications of a theoretical paper on common agency by Laussel and Le Breton (1998) , who introduce a random parameter in the agent's cost function which is not realized at the contracting stage. They demonstrate that, as in the complete information case, truthful equilibria are efficient (it maximizes the total benefits of the principals and the common agent). In our model, the R&D costs would become µs(x), where µ is a positive random variable. The laboratory would not know the realization of µ before accepting or refusing the the firms' contracts, and would learn it afterwards.
Non-Cooperative R&D. Each firm i = 1, 2 chooses its R&D independently to maximize its individual net profit function π * i (x) − γ 2 x 2 i . This yields two reaction functions which we use to solve for a symmetric non-cooperative R&D outcome:
Substitute x n for x 1 and x 2 in a firm's net profit expression to obtain the symmetric equilibrium payoff:
A sufficient second-order condition for a maximum is γb (2 − θ ) 2 (2 + θ ) 2 −2 (2 − θ β ) 2 > 0 (so that each firm's objective function is concave). Henriques (1990) establishes that the reaction functions in the R&D space cross "correctly" when ∂ x i /∂ x j is less than 1, with i, j = 1, 2, i = j. This condition can be rewritten here as:
Note that (16) 
Proof of Proposition 2
The Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions are:
We check that a candidate solutionx, withx 1 = 0 andx 2 ≡x d > 0 (without loss of generality since the two firms are identical), satisfies these conditions. First,
= 0, leading to:
Second,
≤ 0 if and only if:
This is is verified if and only if
which we define the threshold:
This leads to two exclusive cases: 1) δ ∈ −γ,¯δ implies:
in which case the corner solutionx = (0,¯x 2 ) applies. A sufficient second-order condition for a maximum is:
which holds for all ∆ > 0. To see that¯δ is in [−γ,γ), first observe that¯δ has a non-positive slope in the plane (β,δ), since 2) δ ∈ (¯δ,γ) implies:
in which case (18) is violated and there is an interior solution. Then we solve in x i the two symmetric equations:
This gives each firm's equilibrium delegated R&D outcome:
Substituting (20) into Λ(x) leads to:
The second-order condition:
is sufficient for a maximum (an increase in β or in δ makes the condition stronger, an increase in either θ or γ relaxes it).
Proof of Proposition 3
We build on Laussel and Le Breton (2001) -henceforth LLB -by associating to the delegated common agency game, as introduced in section 2, a transferable utility cooperative game with characteristic function Π : 2 N → R, as defined in (6). Then the proof consists in investigating additive properties of Π on 2 N , with N = {1, 2}, in order to exploit a series of theorems that characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game, as follows:
• If Π(S) is strictly subadditive, that is:
then #N = 2 implies from LLB's Theorem 3.3 (p. 104) that the firms' symmetric profits in the delegated R&D game are:
The laboratory's benefit being equal to the difference between joint profits and the firms' payoffs, from (24) we obtain L = Π({1}) + Π({2}) − Λ, which is positive from (23).
• If Π(S) is superadditive, that is:
then from LLB's Theorem 3.2 (p. 103) the agent exactly breaks even, that is L = 0, and the firms' equilibrium payoffs are such π d 1 + π d 2 = Λ. Since firms are identical, and to compare with the cooperative and non-cooperative cases, we focus on:
The remainder of the proof identifies values of δ which are such that Π(S) is either strictly subadditive or superadditive. To that effect we solve for values of δ such that (25) holds with equality, to obtain a frontier which we denote by δ L =0 . However, the free maximization of Π(S), for S = {i}, i = 1,2, may yield negative maximizers. Therefore, we consider in turn the free-maximum and constrainedmaximum versions of (6), denoted byˇΠ({i}) andˆΠ({i}), respectively. We thus obtain two frontiersˇδ L =0 (free-maximum) andˆδ L =0 (constrained-maximum) each of which verify (25) with equality. We then calculate the values of δ for which the free maximizerˇx j is equal toˆx j ≡0, and denote it by δx j =ˆx j =0 . Finally, we comparê δ L =0 andˇδ L =0 with δx j =ˆx j =0 to verify for which values of β either the frontieř δ L =0 or the frontierˆδ L =0 applies. This allows us to derive the frontier δ L =0 by "pasting" these two functions of β.
Free and Constrained Solutions. There are three steps: 1) Firstly, we solve the free-maximum version of (6), with S = {i}, i = 1,2. The problem is:
where π * i (x i , 0) is obtained by setting x j =x j ≡ 0 in (11). A sufficient second-order condition for a maximum is Γ 4 ≡ γb 4 − θ 2 2 − 2 (2 − θ β ) 2 > 0, implying that the objective function in (29) is concave. This gives the constrained R&D:
Substitutingx i into the right-hand side of (29) gives:
3) We now derive the frontier δx j =x j =0 . This yields:
Hence we replace Π({i}) by (28) if δ ≥ δx j =x j =0 , and by (30) otherwise, in the expression (24) of the profits of the firms π d .
The Laboratory's Zero-Benefits Free-maximum Frontierδ L =0 . We evaluate (25), assuming it holds with equality with free-maximum profits to obtain:
whereΠ({1}) andΠ({2}) are given by (28). There are two roots to (32). The first is δ = γ, which however violates (27). The second root is:
To check thatδ L =0 applies as a free-maximum frontier, recall from (31) that (33) is defined only ifδ L =0 ≥ δx j =x j =0 . Then equate the difference δx j =x j =0 − δ L =0 to 0, and look for parameter values for which it is non-positive. We find that β = θ /2 and β = 1 are the only admissible roots (the other roots are γ = 0, θ = ±2, β = −1.) Hence the difference changes sign at most once in the domain of β . Evaluating it at some particular values, we find thatδ L =0 is defined only for 0 ≤ β ≤ θ /2.
Finally, note that the frontierδ L =0 includes (β , δ ) = (θ /2, 0).
The Laboratory's Zero-Benefits Constrained-maximum Frontierδ L =0 . As in the previous section, we evaluate (25) assuming it holds with equality, but using the constrained profits (30), and solve for its roots.
The first root a = c is not admissible by assumption. The second root is:
To check thatˆδ L =0 applies as a constrained-maximum frontier, recall from (31) that (34) is defined only ifˆδ L =0 ≤δx j =ˆx j =0 . Then equate the difference δx j =ˆx j =0 −ˆδ L =0 to 0, and look for parameter values for which it is non-positive. We find β = θ/2 as the only admissible root (the others are γ = 0, θ = 2, β = −1). Hence the difference changes sign once over the domain of β. Evaluating (34) at particular values leads to the conclusion thatˆδ L =0 is defined only for θ/2≤β≤1. Finally, note that, as forˇδ L =0 , the frontierˆδ L =0 includes (β,δ) = (θ/2,0). The Laboratory's Zero-Benefits Frontier δ L =0 . The conclusions of the last two sections establish that (25) holds with equality if and only if:
whereˇδ L =0 andˆδ L =0 are explicitly given by (33) and (34).
(ˇδ L =0 ) Differentiating (33) with respect to β and equating to 0 yields five roots (γ = 0, θ = ±2, or β = ±1), none of which is admissible. It follows thatˇδ L =0 is strictly monotone over the domain of β on whichˇδ L =0 is defined, that is [0,θ/2]. To complete the proof, let for instance β = θ/2, and check that dˇδ L =0 /dβ < 0.
(ˆδ L =0 ) Differentiating (34) with respect to β and equating to 0 yields four roots (γ = 0, θ = ±2, or β = −1), none of which is admissible. It follows thatˆδ L =0 is strictly monotone over the domain of β on whichˆδ L =0 is defined, that is [θ/2,1]. To complete the proof, let, for instance β = 1, and check that dˆδ L =0 /dβ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
It suffices to differentiate (19), then (33) and (34), with respect to θ and γ.
Proof of Proposition 5
Firstly, if β = θ/2, for all δ, concentrated profits π * i (x) depend only on each firm i's own R&D variable x i (Property 1), in which case the cooperative and non-cooperative games coincide. Secondly, if δ = 0, for all β , we have s(x) = γ 2 (x 2 1 + x 2 2 ) (Property 2), and solving the cooperative game is equivalent to solving the delegated game (Proposition 1). Thirdly, if β = θ /2 and δ = 0, the laboratory earns no benefits (Proposition 3). By considering all three cases together, we conclude that the cooperative, non-cooperative, and delegated R&D games yield identical outcomes at the non-externalities point (θ /2, 0).
Proof of Lemmas
We first establish how indirect externalities impact optimal outcomes in the delegated R&D game. This is given in Lemmas A-1 to A-3. They will be useful for the proofs of the corresponding Lemmas 1 to 3, which follow. We consider δ > δ L =0 and δ ≤ δ L =0 in turn, as follows:
Recalling that the laboratory's cost are given by (1), joint profits by (4), and using the envelope theorem, we differentiate (36) with respect to δ to obtain:
which is unambiguously positive given that x d > 0.
(δ ≤ δ L =0 ) Assume that π d is non increasing in δ , that is:
Then look for a contradiction. To do that, recall from Proposition 1 that the laboratory maximizes joint profits, and from Proposition 3 that it exactly breaks even if δ = δ L =0 . Consequently:
Moreover, recalling that the laboratory's cost are given by (1) and joint profits by (4), by using the envelope theorem we obtain dΛ/dδ = (x d ) 2 , which is un-ambiguously positive given that x d > 0. It follows that:
To conclude, taking (38), (39), and (40) together leads to:
by transitivity. Inequality (41) Welfare is defined as the sum of the profits of the firms and consumer surplus. It has been established above that profits π d are increasing in δ. Here we turn to consumer surplus by investigating how q i (x d ) and p i (x d ) vary with δ. Differentiating the Cournot-Nash symmetric equilibrium output (10) evaluated at x d = (x d ,x d ), with respect to δ, we obtain:
which is positive from (20) and (22). Differentiating the inverse demand function evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium levels in x d = (x d ,x d ), with respect to δ, we obtain:
which is negative, again from (20) and (22). Taking (42) and (43) together means that the consumer surplus is increasing in δ. The fact that the profits of the firms are also increasing in δ (Lemma A-2) completes the proof.
We may now prove Lemma 1 by considering the frontiers δ x d =x c and δ x d =x n, as follows.
Equal Delegated and Cooperative R&D Frontier δ x d =x c. As x d is monotone increasing in δ (Lemma A-1) and x c is invariant with δ, it follows that if there exists a value of δ for which x d = x c , it is unique. Moreover, for δ = 0, (i) the costs of R&D are the same for the laboratory in the delegated R&D and for both firms in the cooperative game (see Property 2), and (ii) solving the delegated game for x d is equivalent to solving the cooperative game for x c (Proposition 1). Hence, x d = x c for δ = 0. Making use of that result, and of Proposition 3, gives Lemma 1-(i).
Equal Delegated and Non-Cooperative R&D Frontier δ x d =x n . Using (14) and (20) we define:
From (20) and (14), we obtain that X(δ ) is continuous by verifying that the denominator of X(δ ) has no admissible root. If β = θ /2, Proposition 5 establishes that X(0) = 0. Now consider the cases β < θ /2 and β > θ /2, as follows:
Claim 1: X(δ ) < 0. We have established above that x d = x c for δ = 0. Next, we know from AJ that x c < x n for β ∈ [0, θ /2) and all values of δ . Claim 1 follows by transitivity.
Claim 2: X(δ ) > 0 along δ L =0 . Recall from (35) that δ L =0 =δ L =0 > 0 for β < θ /2. Then evaluating (44) at δ =δ L =0 , and equating to 0 gives seven roots (γ = 0, θ = ±2, α = 0, β = θ /2, β = 1, b = 0), none of which is admissible. Therefore, X(δ L =0 ) does not change sign. It is straightforward to check that claim 2 holds by computing X(δ L =0 ) at, say, β = 0 and any admissible values for the other parameters, and obtaining a positive value.
(β > θ /2) Claim 3: X(δ ) > 0 for δ = 0. Recall that x d = x c for δ = 0, as established above. Then note that x c > x n for β ∈ (θ /2, 1], all δ . Claim 3 follows by transitivity.
Claim 4: X(δ ) < 0 along δ L =0 . Recall from (35) that δ L =0 =δ L =0 < 0 for β > θ /2, evaluate (44) at δ =δ L =0 , and equating to 0 gives seven roots (γ = 0, θ = ±2, α = 0, β = θ /2, β = 2/θ , b = 0), none of which is admissible. Therefore, X(δ L =0 ) does not change sign. It is straightforward to check that X(δ L =0 ) is negative by evaluating it at, say, β = 1 and any value for other parameters.
Recall how δ L =0 is constructed in (35). Using claims 1 to 4, that x d is continuous and monotone increasing in δ (Lemma A-1) while x n does not vary with δ , means there exists a unique δ ≡ δ x d =x n such that x d x n iff δ δ x d =x n , with δ x d =x n as in Lemma 1-(ii).
The proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3, which use Lemmas A-2 and A-3 respectively, are very similar, and so are omitted. They are available from the authors.
